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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we examine the association between product market competition and financial analysts’ forecasting 
properties in a sample of 76,621 analyst-firm-year observations in South Korea between 2000 and 2014. Using the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index to proxy for product market competition, we document that financial analysts are likely 
to issue less accurate and more optimistic forecasts in highly competitive product markets. In addition, we find that 
analysts’ reports show more optimism in stock recommendations in firms with high market competition.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
his study investigates the effects of disclosure environments induced by product market competition on 
the properties of analysts’ reports. Several researchers have attempted to provide substantial evidence 
for the influence of product market competition in corporate information environments based on 
managers’ disclosure policies with consideration of the proprietary costs for firms. However, the existing research 
outcomes regarding the link between product market competition and corporate information environments are mixed 
(Beyer, Cohen, Lys & Walther, 2010; Berger, 2011). One line of research describes that product market competition 
is a market force to alleviate agency costs (Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997; Baggs & Bettignies, 2007). Competition is 
generally thought to limit managerial opportunism when earnings are reported, thereby improving the quality of the 
information environment (Laksmana & Yang, 2012). Moreover, Stivers (2004) reports that revelation of proprietary 
information strengthens market competition. This reduces information asymmetry costs, allowing firms to obtain more 
favorable financing. Product market competition also suppresses opportunities for expropriation by managers; 
therefore, firms in highly competitive markets are expected to have transparent information environments. 
 
On the other hand, some studies suggest a negative relationship between product market competition and corporate 
information environments. Through competition, firms are able to assess managers’ performance compared with their 
competitors (Vickers, 1995; Meyer & Vickers, 1997) and competition also intensifies managers’ career concerns 
(Feriozzi, 2011). In a similar vein, DeFond and Park (1999) find that high competitive industries show more frequent 
chief executive officer (CEO) turnover compared to less competitive industries. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
managers in more competitive markets have a tendency to withhold information, and thus leads to an environment in 
which less informative disclosure is common; in these markets, business strategies and corporate profits are highly 
affected by the actions of competitors. In addition, the link between competition and the information environment 
may be associated with the innovation strategy in an industry. Since innovative firms are associated with information 
complexity, the implications of their information are difficult to assess. Thus, we can reason that analysts may have 
greater difficulties in proper assessment and prediction of firm performance in competitive industries. 
 
We first investigate the relation between product market competition and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. We find 
a positive association between product market competition and less accurate earnings forecasts, as measured by 
relative measures of analysts’ forecast accuracy (Hong & Kubik, 2003; Cowen, Groysberg & Healy, 2006; Bae, Stulz 
T 
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& Tan, 2008). The results do not change in complementary tests using Fama-Macbeth estimation, which considers 
potential bias problems caused by data dependence. We then examine whether bias occurs in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for firms in competitive product markets. We find significant forecast optimism in analysts’ forecasts in 
competitive product markets after controlling for relevant firm and year, as well as analyst characteristics. Finally, we 
investigate optimism in analysts’ stock recommendations for firms in competitive product markets. We report a 
stronger relationship between high competition and optimistic bias in stock recommendations. This result suggests 
that product market competition intensifies managerial tendencies withholding firm-specific information, thereby 
deteriorating the information environment in which analysts must work by increasing optimism in stock 
recommendations. 
 
This study makes substantial contributions to the existing literature. First, prior accounting literature reports mixed 
evidence on the relationship between product market competition and corporate information environments. In 
addition, we incorporate additional properties of analysts’ reports to provide a more comprehensive, in-depth analysis. 
Second, given that analysts’ forecasting activities play an integral role in investors’ asset pricing, it is important to 
understand the effect of product market competition on analysts’ reports. In line with this, our results have implications 
for investors who use analysts’ reports for firm valuation since more accurate and pessimistic forecasting is associated 
with more precise valuations. Finally, from another perspective, our study is also related to literature on financial 
analysts’ compensation. Our findings suggest the notion that competition creates incentives for analysts’ brokerage 
house to compensate based on relative forecast accuracy by incorporating the difference in information complexity of 
different industries. 
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides the prior research and develops the hypotheses. Section 
III explains the research design and the data. Section IV presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Section V 
summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
II. RELATED RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Product Market Competition 
 
In the lack of associated costs of disclosure, firms release all value-relevant information, both public and private, to 
investors and managers are unable to withhold firm-specific information due to the problem of adverse selection 
(Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). However, if we consider the disclosure costs associated with releasing private 
information such as proprietary costs, only partial-disclosure equilibrium might be established. This is because naïve 
investors are unable to determine whether the withholding of information is due to avoiding the bad news or to the 
costs related to disclosing good news (Verrecchia, 1983). Since the demand for corporate information comes from a 
variety of market participants such as shareholders, creditor, employees, and monitoring agencies, it is plausible that 
the disclosure of all value-relevant information has different impacts on these parties. For instance, information about 
new products may be relevant to its stakeholders and the future prospects of a firm, but at the same time, it might also 
reveal firm-specific strategies to competitors, thereby damaging firms’ competitive advantages. These negative effects 
are referred to as proprietary costs, and such costs related to competitors. Research on product market competition 
provides mixed results as to whether product market competition encourages or discourages disclosure of corporate 
value-relevant information. 
 
Prior studies on product market competition and disclosure environments report a positive side of competition on the 
quality of disclosure, demonstrating that competition plays disciplinary mechanism which enforces managements to 
exercise their best efforts not to fail in the competition. According to Dhaliwal, Huang, Khurana & Pereira (2012), high 
competition in product market leads to more timely recognition of losses in accounting earnings; Darrough and 
Stoughton (1990) document that higher competitive market where potential competitors can enter the market with 
lower entry costs induces greater disclosure of bad news for firms by discouraging additional entry of rivals to the 
existing market; Laksmana and Yang (2012) find that both accruals-based and real activity-based earnings 
management are less dominant among firms in more competitive markets than among those in less competitive 
markets; Li, Lundholm & Minnis (2013) demonstrates a positive relationship between the degree of competition and 
industry pervasiveness of management forecasts; and Cheng, Man and Yi (2013) find that product market competition 
is positively associated with various earnings attributes. 
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In another stream of research on product market competition, a negative association between competition and 
disclosure environment has been demonstrated. Li et al. (2013) shows that when market competition among industries 
is imperfect, the quality of management forecasts is lower. Moreover, Gertner, Gibbons & Scharfstein (1988) and 
Verrecchia and Weber (2006) report a negative association between firms within more competitive industries and the 
level of disclosure, supporting the notion of proprietary costs which might incur when competitors get the information. 
Similarly, Wagenhofer (1990) adds that greater product market competition constrains disclosure from mature 
competitors as well as potential entrants. In a theoretical context, competition may play a role in accelerating the 
manipulation of earnings to win in the competition, especially for firms that underperform compared to their 
competitors (Markarian & Santalo, 2014). Regarding equity markets, highly competitive firms tend to have more 
volatile idiosyncratic returns, allowing higher risk-adjusted returns for the informed traders (Gaspar & Massa, 2006; 
Hou & Robinson, 2006; Irvine & Pontiff, 2009).  
  
Product Market Competition and Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts 
  
Financial analysts’ reports are the final results that include the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information 
regarding firms’ prospects. Throughout this process, analysts and managers participate in interaction by giving and 
taking information. If managers want to meet analysts’ forecasts, they can guide analysts in order to downward their 
expectation. However, this raises the question whether managerial guidance affects analysts’ forecasting activities 
inappropriately.  
 
In the presence of product market competition, managers’ guidance can improve transparency by increasing 
disclosure, which facilitates tailoring of their product offerings. Prior literature finds that more competitive industries 
are more inclined to disclose segment information than less competitive industries (Harris, 1998; Hayes & Lundholm, 
1996). In addition, Stivers (2004) shows the positive relationship between competition and the degree of revelation 
on proprietary information. The author claims that in competitive product markets with a large number of competitors, 
at least one firm is liable to release its information, which leads to others doing so; thus, market participants activate 
the process of disclosure. This unraveling process eventually leads to full disclosure along with increase in the number 
of firms in the product market.   
 
Another incentive for revealing proprietary information is to reduce the costs of information asymmetry, for example, 
by obtaining external financing at a lower cost of capital. Likewise, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) find a negative 
association between competition and cost for gathering firm-specific information. They suggest that investors in 
competitive markets do not fully incorporate the negative externalities of market competition with regard to cash flows 
and stock returns.  
 
Another plausible link is associated with agency problems. According to literature, market competition plays an 
important disciplining role for managers to work harder to satisfy the interest of outside shareholders (Allen & Gale, 
2000; Giroud & Mueller, 2010). Thus, managers can attempt to maximize value or manage costs effectively and 
efficiently in order to mitigate agency costs, resulting in a more transparent disclosure environment. 
 
On the other hand, managers are sometimes hesitant to disclose value-relevant information. For example, prior studies 
report that under intense competition, managers may be reluctant to release significant information to minimize 
proprietary costs which might incur when rivals get the information (Verrecchia, 1983; Clinch & Verrecchia, 1997). 
In addition, there is a study to report a positive link between product market competition and disclosure environments 
with regard to the degree of innovation within industries (Nickell, 1996). Similarly, Hou and Robinson (2006) find 
that innovative firms in highly competitive markets entail more risk due to inherent volatility within innovation. 
Innovative assets also include more complex information compared to other types of assets in the following reasons: 
inherent uncertainty about the capitalization of innovative products, ambiguous property rights regarding the assets, 
and the absence of active markets and appropriate valuation for most innovative products. Thus, high information 
complexity related to innovation activities may increase the difficulty for stakeholders assessing the contribution of 
innovative activities to the firm’s future earnings, thereby complicating analysts’ forecasting tasks. 
 
Overall, many studies have demonstrated that product market competition in a given industry influences the corporate 
disclosure strategy. Therefore, product market competition contributes to forming corporate disclosure environments, 
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which in turn affects analysts’ forecasting environment. However, studies on product market competition do not 
provide consistent results on the relationship between product market competition and analysts’ forecasting activities. 
The inconsistent results of previous studies with regard to the degree of information disclosure in competitive product 
markets raise an interesting empirical question: do analysts’ forecasts affect the quality of performance for firms in 
more competitive product markets? 
 
Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy 
 
Brown (1993) examines the relations between the accuracy of an analyst's forecast and complexity associated with 
making forecasts. They provide evidence that as long as firms in competitive product markets provide accurate 
information about future earnings, analysts’ forecast accuracy will increase with the informativeness of managers’ 
disclosure policies (which is influenced by the degree of market competition). However, previous evidence on 
potential relation between product market competition and disclosure of information in competitive industries is 
mixed. A potential explanation for these mixed results is because the measure of analysts’ forecast accuracy only 
compares analysts’ forecasts with actual reported earnings. These measures of absolute forecast accuracy are strongly 
affected by whether earnings are particularly hard to forecast due to market competition. 
 
Each individual analyst is situated and performs differently compared to other analysts, thus providing greater 
difference in contents of analyst’s report. Specifically, legal and financial reporting environment in which he or she 
operates (Barniv, Myring & Thomas, 2005), the environment of the individual workplace (Jacob, Lys & Neale, 1999), and 
his or her innate ability and firm-specific experience (Clement, 1999) may produce difference among analysts. In this 
reason, product market competition may only explain some parts of the differences in analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
Thus, the inconsistent results of competition on analyst forecast accuracy in literature could be attributable to the 
measurement errors of absolute forecast accuracy (Barniv et al., 2005; Jacob et al., 1999; Clement, 1999; Shon & 
Shin, 2014). To alleviate this problem, this study employs relative forecast accuracy that includes a comparison among 
peer analysts. As such, considering the ongoing debate on the relation between product market competition and 
relative forecast accuracy, the first non-directional hypothesis is therefore as follows (stated in the null form).  
 
H1: Product market competition is not associated with relative analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
 
Analysts’ Forecast Optimism 
 
Prior studies shows that analysts issue optimistic forecasts in analysts’ reports in order to increase economic 
performance which is largely related to trading volume and investment banking (Ackert & Athanassakos, 1997; Das, 
Levine & Sivaramakrishnan, 1998). In other words, uncertainty in the information environment increases optimism in 
analysts’ reports to curry favor with managers and to achieve non-public information about the firm (Huberts & Fuller, 
1995; Ackert & Athanassakos, 1997; Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001). This expectation is labeled “the management-
relations hypothesis”. According to this hypothesis, analysts tend to issue more optimistic forecasts in order to expand 
the amount, period, and type of information they receive from managers in competitive product markets. 
 
By contrast, Hart (1983) and Baggs and Bettignies (2007) assert that product market competition is a market force 
mitigating agency problems. In terms of external governance mechanisms, competition constrains management 
opportunism in reporting operating performance (Laksmana & Yang, 2012). Similarly, Cheng et al. (2013) find that 
product market competition is positively associated with various earnings attributes. Taken together, these arguments 
indicate that firms in markets with high competition may have less complex earnings predictability and less optimistic 
analysts’ forecasts. 
 
Given these opposing predictions of the relation between product market competition and optimism in analysts’ 
forecasts, it is an empirical question whether analysts’ forecasts show more optimism under competitive 
circumstances. To address this issue, we propose the non-directional hypothesis as follows (stated in the null form): 
 
H2: Product market competition is not associated with analysts’ forecast optimism. 
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Analysts’ Recommendation Optimism 
 
While analysts’ earnings forecasts focus on providing information of future cash flows to compute stock valuations 
by reflecting quantitative aspects, analysts’ stock recommendations reflect qualitative aspects of reports by showing 
their own assessment through buy/sell opinions (Cowles, 1933; Bidwell, 1977; Womack, 1996). Prior studies 
demonstrate that earnings are not sufficient to determine the stock valuation (Hayn, 1995; Barth et al., 1998). Likewise, 
Schipper (1991) also argues that analysts’ forecasted earnings are not final products but intermediate medium that 
requires more input in producing a final product. Womack (1996) suggests that stock recommendations can be 
analysts’ own opinions on the current stock price based on the publicly available information. Their opinions on the 
relative degree of undervaluation or overvaluation indicate the inaccuracy of current stock price. Therefore, 
recommendations are more indicative of whether the stock is mispriced due to the investors’ misinterpretation of 
previously released information. 
 
According to the literature, analysts' promotions and job terminations may affect their forecasting ability, as measured 
by past forecast accuracy (Stickel, 1992; Mikhail, Walther & Willis, 1999). Considering analysts’ reliance on material 
public information to issue recommendations (Stickel, 1989; Ivkovic & Jegadeesh, 2004), analysts who have 
performed better in forecasting and choosing stocks may also have greater expertise in analyzing the value relevance 
of public information. 
 
Insofar as product market competition takes a crucial role for the efficient allocation of resources and disciplinary 
mechanism to reduce managerial opportunism, competition is expected to enhance the quality of public information. 
In this circumstance, financial analysts may be able to exercise greater objectivity in evaluating available information, 
which may enable them to develop less optimistic recommendations. On the other hand, under high competition, 
managers may have a tendency to withhold information for fear of proprietary costs. In response to managers’ 
disclosure policies, therefore, analysts may issue optimistic stock recommendations (upward bias) in order to maintain 
investment banking business and acquire trading commissions through close access to management (Francis, Hanna & 
Philbrick, 1997; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Irvine, 2004). 
 
Thus, the directional association between product market competition and analysts’ optimism in stock 
recommendation is an empirical question. Even though substantial papers show bias in analysts’ stock 
recommendations (Abarbanell, Lanen & Verrecchia, 1995; Lin & McNichols, 1998; McNichols & O’Brien, 1997), none 
of these papers directly examines the relationship between product market competition and optimism in stock 
recommendations. Following these arguments, we propose the following null hypothesis:  
 
H3: Product market competition is not associated with analysts’ stock recommendation optimism. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
 
Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy 
 
We use two measures of analysts’ forecast accuracy. The first measure is called “absolute analysts’ forecast accuracy” 
and it is widely employed in prior studies (Loh & Mian, 2006; Sohn & Shin, 2014). The second accuracy measure is 
termed “relative analysts’ forecast accuracy”, and it controls for analysts’ accuracy ranking and the degree of 
complexity in analysts’ forecasts (Hong, Kubik & Solomon, 2000, Hong & Kubik, 2003, Cowen et al., 2006). The 
difference between two measures is in how to define analyst i’s forecast accuracy reporting of firm j’s earnings per 
share (EPS) for period t, AFAijt. More clearly, we measure the first measure of absolute analysts’ forecast accuracy 
(AAFAijt) by the negative value of the absolute value of the difference between the most recent individual analyst (i)’s 
EPS forecast for firm j (FEPSijt) and the actual EPS of firm j in year t (AEPSjt), and we standardized the absolute value 
of the difference by the stock price at year-end (Pj). By multiplying the negative one, we can interpret an increase in 
forecast accuracy simply using this measure. 
 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐴#$% = −1 × *+,-./012+,-/0,/ 																																																			 (1) 
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Our second measure of relative analysts’ forecast accuracy, which controls for analysts’ accuracy ranking and 
forecasting complexity, defines RAFAijt as 
 𝑅𝐴𝐹𝐴#$% = 100 − 6789./01:2*/01: ∗ 100		 (2) 
 RAFA?@A = 100- CDEFGHI-:JEDKLMANOKKOP?EQHI-: *100      
where Rankijt implies analyst i’s rank of absolute forecast accuracy for firm j in year t, and AFjt is defined as the 
number of analysts following firm j in year t by issuing earnings forecasts for firm j. To calculate Rankijt, we basically 
employ the absolute analyst’s forecast accuracy for firm j in year t, and then we determine the rank of each analyst 
relative to all other analysts following the firm j. If there are multiple analysts’ forecasts for firm j in year t, the nearest 
forecast to earnings announcement date is adopted. The measure of the relative forecast accuracy considers the 
differences in each analyst’s following across firms and years, and it ranges from 0 to 100 percent, meaning that the 
bigger the number the more accurate it is. In this manner, higher relative forecast accuracy is interpreted as a more 
accurate analyst’s forecast relative to other analysts’ forecasts for firm j in year t. 
 
Earnings Forecast Optimism 
 
We use a measure of earnings forecast optimism according to the method of Cowen et al. (2006). This measure is 
based on the idea that compares the optimism of individual analyst’s forecast with those of all other analysts following 
for firm j in year t in a forecasting horizon. By doing this, we can control for any differences across firms and years 
that influence optimistic bias in analysts’ forecast. As such, we measure the relative forecast optimism in the following 
equation:  
 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚?@A = *+,-./01`aDE(*+,-/0)-de(*+,-HI) 	 (3) 
 
where FEPSijt is the most recent individual analyst (i)’s EPS forecast for firm j in year t. Then, we deduct average 
value of FEPSijt from the FEPSijt. This process allows us to compare FEPSijt with the average forecasts for all other 
analysts following firm j in year t considering the forecast horizon. For standardization of this measure, relative 
forecast optimism is divided by the standard deviation of all the analysts’ EPS forecasts for firm j in year t.  
 
Product Market Competition 
 
We use a measure of Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy for product market competition. This measure is 
calculated by the sum of the squares of the industry-level market shares of the firms’ sales at year-end.  
 𝐻𝐻𝐼9 	= -7hij/k-7hij/kl/mn o8$p: 		 (4) 
 
where Salesjk is defined as the market share of sales for firm j in industry k, and n counts the number of firms including 
in industry k at year-end. The value of this measure decreases along with the number of competitors and increases 
with the variability in market share of firm within the industry. In other words, HHI is inversely affected by the product 
market competition. For the convenience of interpretation, we set a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the 
case where the value of HHI is smaller than the median, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Empirical Models 
 
We examine the association between the impact of product market competition and analysts’ forecast accuracy in our 
testing of hypothesis 1. Both the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with clustered standard errors at the firm 
level (Petersen, 2009) and the Fama-MacBeth regressions are used to test Hypothesis 1. 
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𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠	𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦#$% = 𝛼u + 𝛼:𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝐻𝐻𝐼#$% + 𝛼o𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒$z +𝛼{𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟	𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒#$% + 𝛼~𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐	𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒#% + 𝛼𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛#$% +𝛼𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚	𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒#z + 𝛼𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒#z + 𝛼𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒#z + 𝛼𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡	𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔$z +𝜀#$%		 (5) 
 
Following Lim and Jung (2012), Analysts’ Forecast Accuracyijt is measured as either the relative or absolute accuracy 
of analysts’ EPS forecasts. Dummy for HHIijt is a dummy variable that equals to one if analyst i EPS forecasts for firm 
j in a highly competitive market in t, and zero otherwise. The significant positive (negative) coefficient of Dummy for 
HHI (α1) interprets that product market competition is positively (negatively) associated with increasing analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. Firm sizejY is measured by the log of market value for firm j in year Y. Firmsize is included to 
control for the amount of public information leading to more accurate forecasts (Bae et al., 2008). We control for the 
experience of analysts with a firm as career experience and firm-specific experience. Career experienceit indicates 
analysts’ expertise, begins analyst i’s first forecast that is reported in the DataguidePro database. Firm-specific 
experienceijt means analysts’ firm-specific expertise, begins analyst i’s first forecast for a particular firm j in the 
database. Forecast horizonijt is measured as the period between the date of forecast in year t and the actual earnings 
announcement date in year t. By including the forecast horizon, we can control the analyst workload or task 
complexity, which can affect forecast accuracy (Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999). We also control for the number 
of firms covered by any given analyst. Moreover, we control for the degree of specialization by including the number 
of industries covered by an analyst and for possible advantages in forecasting due to the size of the security firm by 
including broker size. Specifically, Firm coverageiY is the number of firms analyst i follows during the year Y; Industry 
coverageiY is the number of industries analyst i follows during the year Y; Broker sizeiY is the number of analysts who 
work in same securities firms as measured at the end of year Y. Finally, Analyst following is calculated by the number 
of analysts following a particular firm j at the end of year Y (Gu & Xue, 2008).   
 
Next, we test the second hypothesis using the following equation. 
 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠	𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠	𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚#$% 	= 	𝛼u + 𝛼:𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝐻𝐻𝐼#$% + 𝛼o𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒$z +𝛼{𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟	𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒#$% + 𝛼~𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐	𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒#% + 𝛼𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛#$% +𝛼𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚	𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒#z + 𝛼𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒#z + 𝛼𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒#z 	+ 𝛼𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡	𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔$z +𝑒#$%		 (6) 
 
The definition of variables is identical with that is used in equation (5), except that the dependent variable is analysts’ 
forecasts optimism. We also use both OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at firm level and Fama-MacBeth 
regressions simultaneously. If the coefficient of the Dummy for HHI (α1) in equation (6) is significantly positive 
(negative), product market competition would be positively (negatively) related to increasing optimism in analysts’ 
forecasts. 
 
In our third regression analysis, we regress analysts’ recommendation optimism against product market competition 
following the protocol in Cowen et al. (2006). Analysts’ stock recommendations are shown in the form of a discrete 
and ordinal expression, thus violating the basic assumptions of OLS. Instead, an ordered logit regression is used to 
investigate optimism in stock recommendation, as follows (Cowen et al., 2006; Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008). 
 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘	𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚#$% = 𝛼u +	𝛼:𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝐻𝐻𝐼#$% + 	𝛼o𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟	𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒#$% +𝛼{𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐	𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒#$% + 𝛼~𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛#$% + 𝛼𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒	𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦#$% +𝛼𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔	𝐵𝑢𝑦#$% + 𝛼𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝐵𝑢𝑦#$% + 𝛼𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑#$% +𝛼𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚#$% + 𝛼:u𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙#$% + 	𝑒	#$%	 (7) 
  
Stock recommendations are consisted of 5 categories. Specifically, ‘Strong Buy’ opinion for a stock recommendation 
is coded as 4; ‘Buy’ opinion is coded as 3; ‘Hold’ opinion is coded as 2; ‘Under-perform’ opinion is coded as 1; 
Finally, 0 is coded for a ‘Sell’ opinion. In addition, absolute forecast accuracy is included to control for the relation 
between forecast accuracy and stock recommendations (Hong & Kubik, 2003). The significantly positive (negative) 
coefficient of α1 means that analysts’ stock recommendations for firms in highly competitive industries are more (less) 
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optimistic than those for firms in less competitive industries. The definitions of all other variables are followed in 
equation (5).  
 
Sample Selection 
 
Our analysts’ EPS forecasts and stock recommendations data is extracted from the DataguidePro database for 
companies listed in the KSE (Korean Stock Exchange) and the KOSDAQ (Korean Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation). For each forecast and recommendation, we track the related company name, the issuance dates of the 
forecast and recommendation, the code of the analyst and security firm based on its textual data, and actual EPSjt for 
firm j in year t. To identify actual earnings announcement dates for firm j in year t, we also use the TS-2000 database. 
 
This procedure results in 1,165,074 analyst-firm-year observations. Then we exclude forecasts without actual earnings 
announcement dates to identify the most recent stock recommendations and for calculating forecast horizons. We also 
delete any additional analyst-firm-year level observations that do not meet the following criteria: (1) the most nearest 
EPS forecasts to the actual announcement date for firm j in year t to alleviate concern about dependencies among 
recommendations, (2) firms should be followed by at least two analysts to estimate relative forecast accuracy and 
optimism, (3) forecasts for which the Korea Standard Industry Code (KSIC) codes of forecasted firms can be traced, 
and (4) forecasts and recommendations for which the values for accuracy and optimism are not missing and data for 
all control variables are available. In total, 76,621 analyst-firm-year observations are identified between January 1, 
2000 and December 31, 2014 as outlined in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure 
 Number of forecasts 
All analysts’ EPS forecasts in DataguidePro  from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2014  1,165,074  
Less: Forecasts without actual earnings reporting dates (97,289) 
Less: No most recent forecast prior to actual earnings reporting date (974,327) 
Less: Forecasts for firms followed by less than two analysts (2,423) 
Less: Forecasts without KSIC codes (13,865) 
Less: Forecasts without control variables (549) 
Final sample 76,621  
 
 
IV. RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Sample Distribution 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of analysts’ EPS forecasts sample by year. Panel A represents a sharp rise in 
the number of forecasts in 2001, a similar number of forecasts between 2001 and 2011, a decrease in 2012, and 
consistent increases by approximately 4% every year after 2013. The pattern seems to be quite evenly distributed by 
year, with no sign of symmetry in the time-series pattern in analysts’ forecasts. Panel B provides the industry 
classification of analysts’ target firms based on the KSIC according to sections. The most frequent industry is 
manufacturing (n = 41,884, 54.66%), followed by those in the professional, scientific, and technical areas (n = 9,145, 
11.94%) and those in information and communications (n = 7,848, 10.24%). In addition, the most competitive industry 
with the lowest value of HHI (0.07) is construction (ranking: 1). The most competitive industries are the financial and 
insurance industries (HHI = 0.10, Rank = 2) and information and communications (HHI = 0.17, Rank = 3). 
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Table 2. Sample Distribution 
Panel A. Distribution by year 
Year Number of forecasts Percentage (%) 
2000 1,960 2.56 
2001 5,959 7.78 
2002 6,584 8.59 
2003 5,964 7.78 
2004 5,953 7.77 
2005 6,372 8.32 
2006 5,613 7.33 
2007 6,148 8.02 
2008 4,834 6.31 
2009 5,919 7.73 
2010 5,735 7.48 
2011 5,780 7.54 
2012 3,043 3.97 
2013 3,448 4.50 
2014 3,309 4.32 
Total 76,621  
 
Panel B. Distribution by industry 
Industry Number of forecasts Percentage (%) HHI Rank 
Construction 2,746  3.58 0.07 1 
Education 492  0.64 0.37 10 
Financial and Insurance Activities 6,050  7.90 0.10 2 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 14  0.02 0.38 12 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 5,289  6.90 0.19 4 
Real Estate Activities and Renting and Leasing 86  0.11 0.37 11 
Business Facilities Management and Business Support 
Services 600  0.78 0.23 7 
Arts, Sports, and Recreation-Related Services 387  0.51 0.36 9 
Transportation 977  1.28 0.45 14 
Electricity, Gas, Steam, and Water Supply 1,099  1.43 0.42 13 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Activities 9,145  11.94 0.20 6 
Manufacturing 41,884  54.66 0.20 5 
Information and Communications 7,848  10.24 0.17 3 
Sewerage, Waste Management, Materials Recovery, and 
Remediation Activities 4  0.01 0.30 8 
Total 76,621    
 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 3 delivers the descriptive statistics in our analysis. The first column of Table 3 lists descriptive statistics for the 
whole sample. The mean (median) value for Relative Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy is 47.996 (50.000), which is quite 
similar to the mean of 49.860 reported in Lim and Jung (2012). The mean value for Absolute Analysts’ Forecast 
Accuracy is -0.123. This value is slightly lower than the mean of -0.071 shown in Shon and Shin (2014), but it is quite 
similar to the mean of -0.103 shown in Lim and Jung (2012). It suggests that the mean price-scaled absolute analysts’ 
forecast error is 0.123. The mean value of Analysts’ Forecast Optimism shows 0.009, indicating that analysts have a 
tendency to forecast optimistically (Shon & Shin, 2014). Especially notable are the mean and median values for Stock 
Recommendation: 2.703 and 3.000, respectively. This means that analysts’ most frequently expressed 
recommendation regarding stocks is “Buy” (coded as 3), showing an optimistic bias in stock recommendation 
(Abarbanell, et al. 1995; McNichols & O’Brien, 1997; Lim & Jung, 2012). The mean HHI of 0.191 is similar to that 
reported by Shon and Shin (2014). Other control variables are shown to have similar patterns to those in the research 
of Lim and Jung (2012). 
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The second and third columns of Table 3 document the descriptive statistics for the subsamples partitioned by the 
degree of product market competition. In both cases, each value of Relative Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy and Absolute 
Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy reveals higher accuracy in the high competition sample, as indicated by the mean values 
of 48.010 and -0.117, respectively, for the high competition sample, and mean values of 47.982 and -0.129, 
respectively, for the low competition sample. However, the results of the difference test are only partially significant. 
It seems that Analysts’ Forecast Optimism is not affected by product market competition. As expected, there are 
significant differences in the Stock Recommendation measure between high and low competition samples. In the high 
competition sample, stock recommendations are more optimistic than in the low competition sample. These outcomes 
suggest that product market competition deteriorates analysts’ information environments. As for the control variables, 
the difference tests for the variables between the two subsamples represent that the mean values for Firm size, Career 
experience, Firm-specific experience, Firm coverage, Industry coverage, and Broker size are significantly higher for 
firms in high competition markets, whereas those for Forecast horizon and Analyst following are higher for firms in 
low competition markets. 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A 
Variables 
Total 
(N# = 76,621) 
Dummy for HHI = 1 
(N# = 38,296) 
Dummy for HHI = 0 
(N# = 38,325) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Relative Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy 47.996  50.000  48.010  50.000  47.982  50.000  
Absolute Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy -0.123  -0.037  -0.117  -0.036  -0.129  -0.037  
Analysts’ Forecast Optimism 0.009  0.090  0.003  0.092  0.014  0.088  
Stock Recommendation 2.703  3.000  2.709  3.000  2.697  3.000  
HHI 0.191  0.185  0.098  0.092  0.284  0.281  
Firm size 13.075  12.966  13.100  13.144  13.050  12.793  
Career experience 3.889  3.000  3.985  3.000  3.792  3.000  
Firm-specific experience 1.886  1.000  1.969  1.000  1.804  1.000  
Forecast horizon 1.078  1.000  1.060  1.000  1.096  1.000  
Firm coverage 13.749  12.000  13.787  12.000  13.711  12.000  
Industry coverage 2.654  2.000  2.673  2.000  2.634  2.000  
Broker size 23.780  22.000  24.115  23.000  23.446  22.000  
Analyst following 17.218  17.000  15.843  16.000  18.592  18.000  
 
Panel B 
Variables Difference 1 – 0 (t-stat) (z-stat) 
Relative Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy 0.028  (0.12) (-0.09) 
Absolute Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy 0.012  (6.06) (-0.30) 
Analysts’ Forecast Optimism -0.011  (-1.63) (-0.81) 
Stock Recommendation 0.011  (3.05) (3.11) 
HHI -0.186  (-401.04) (-239.72) 
Firm size 0.051  (3.93) (8.06) 
Career experience 0.193  (8.42) (9.27) 
Firm-specific experience 0.165  (9.66) (10.80) 
Forecast horizon -0.036  (-5.08) (-5.84) 
Firm coverage 0.076  (1.32) (5.90) 
Industry coverage 0.040  (3.76) (4.66) 
Broker size 0.669  (9.35) (11.86) 
Analyst following -2.749  (-39.17) (-34.71) 
Notes: #indicates that the numbers of observations for Optimism in the whole sample, the subsample with HHI = 1, and the subsample with HHI = 
0 are 76,512, 38,224, and 38,228, respectively. The t-statistics and z-statistics in parentheses are obtained from the t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum 
test, respectively. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 4 presents the results of Pearson and Spearman correlations. The correlations between the Dummy for HHI and 
Relative Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy are significantly positive. The correlations between the Dummy for HHI and 
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Absolute Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy are significant and negative. In addition, the correlations between the Dummy 
for HHI and Stock Recommendation are significant and positive. 
 
 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
No. Variables (N#=76,621) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Relative Forecast Accuracy  0.21 -0.13 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.06  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) 
2 Absolute Forecast Accuracy 0.56  -0.11 0.09 -0.04 0.31 0.12 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
3 Optimism -0.18 -0.07  0.11 0.00 0.01 -0.06 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.30) (0.04) (0.00) 
4 Recommendation -0.09 0.08 0.13  0.01 0.12 0.09 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
5 Dummy for HHI 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01  0.00 -0.02 (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.35) (0.00) 
6 Firm size -0.02 0.35 0.01 0.11 0.00  0.33 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49)  (0.00) 
7 Career experience 0.06 0.18 -0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.33  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)  
8 Firm-specific experience 0.12 0.20 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.34 0.61 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
9 Forecast horizon -0.28 -0.43 0.29 -0.04 0.02 -0.22 -0.18 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
10 Firm coverage 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.15 -0.03 -0.27 0.02 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
11 Industry coverage 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.23 -0.11 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
12 Broker size -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.73) 
13 Analyst following -0.04 0.23 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.61 0.07 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(Table 4 continued on next page) 
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(Table 4 continued) 
No. Variables (N#=76,621) 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Relative Forecast Accuracy 0.08 -0.28 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) 
2 Absolute Forecast Accuracy 0.11 -0.26 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 0.17 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
3 Optimism -0.07 0.29 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
4 Recommendation 0.01 -0.04 -0.14 -0.11 -0.15 0.04 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
5 Dummy for HHI -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) 
6 Firm size 0.34 -0.20 -0.25 -0.23 -0.10 0.61 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
7 Career experience 0.65 -0.15 of the -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 0.06 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
8 Firm-specific experience  -0.19 -0.08 -0.12 0.00 0.16  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.67) (0.00) 
9 Forecast horizon -0.27  0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.16 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
10 Firm coverage -0.03 0.02  0.51 0.02 -0.10 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
11 Industry coverage -0.11 0.07 0.46  0.05 -0.14 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
12 Broker size 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.05  -0.08 (0.00) (0.07) (0.03) (0.00)  (0.00) 
13 Analyst following 0.20 -0.18 -0.11 -0.15 -0.09  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Notes: This table presents the Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations among the variables. P-values are in 
parentheses 
 
 
Testing of Hypothesis 1 
 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the results for the multivariate tests of Hypothesis 1 based on the dependent variable of 
Absolute Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy. In model 1 of Panel A, which presents the OLS results, the coefficient of the 
Dummy for HHI is positive and significant at the 1% level, after controlling for the various determinants of analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. This result is consistent with that competition plays an external governance mechanism in 
improving analysts’ information environments (Shon & Shin, 2014). However, Model 2 of Panel A finds the opposite 
result, demonstrating the limitations of the absolute analysts’ forecast accuracy measure utilized in prior studies. The 
results in the Fama-MacBeth regressions document the positive coefficient for the Dummy for HHI, but it is non-
significant after eliminating the yearly correlations among the variables. These results suggest several important 
things. The Fama-MacBeth estimation (Fama & MacBeth, 1973) addresses the potential bias issue caused by cross-
sectional dependencies in panel data. It entails calculation of the mean values of the yearly coefficients and the t-
values by using the standard errors of the time-series of the yearly estimates.1 For this reason, the results of Model 1 
may have typical endogeneity problems (Lim & Jung, 2012). Put differently, although absolute analysts’ forecast 
accuracy is a function of time, the fact that it occurs so frequently in highly competitive industries seems to indicate 
that high competition increases absolute analysts’ forecast accuracy. Thus, we can conclude that restricting the 
																																								 																				
1 Following Lim and Jung (2012), we estimate the regressions for each of the 15 calendar years separately. Next, we compute the mean value of 
the coefficients across the 15 years and calculate t-statistics for the mean coefficients by using the standard deviation of the estimates for a year. 
The specific equation of Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are as follows: 𝑡 − stat. (coefficient) = mean	(coefficient)115 𝑣𝑎𝑟	(𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
where the mean	(coefficient) = :: 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡#,ou:~#pouuu  var	(coefficient) = ::~ 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡# − mean	(coefficient) o	ou:~#pouuu . 
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measurement of absolute analysts’ forecast accuracy does not support our hypothesis. Thus, we move to the next 
analysis. 
 
Panel B presents the association between Relative Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy and the Dummy for HHI. In Model 1 
of Panel B, the coefficient of the Dummy for HHI is -0.910, which shows significance at the 1% level. Model 2 of 
Panel B is a result from using the Fama-MacBeth method. Similarly, the coefficient for the Dummy for HHI is 
significantly negative at the 1% level, indicating that analysts’ forecasts in highly competitive product markets show 
less accuracy compared to those in less competitive industries after controlling for the potential endogeneity problem. 
The results of the regression analysis also show that Firm size, Firm-specific experience, Forecast horizon, and Analyst 
following reduce Relative Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy, and Firm-specific experience and Firm coverage increase it. 
In summary, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
 
 
Table 5. Analysts' Forecast Accuracy 
Panel A. Absolute Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy 
Variables Predicted sign 
Model 1  
(OLS) 
Model 2  
(Fama-MacBeth) 
Intercept  -0.609 (-66.43)*** -0.595 (-8.08)*** 
Dummy for HHI +/- 0.005 (2.72)*** 0.004 (0.67) 
Firm size + 0.044 (62.07)*** 0.042 (6.36)*** 
Career experience - 0.001 (1.17) 0.001 (0.93) 
Firm-specific experience + -0.003 (-5.06)*** -0.007 (-1.81)* 
Forecast horizon - -0.058 (-61.75)*** -0.058 (-6.03)*** 
Firm coverage +/- 0.000 (0.20) 0.000 (0.67) 
Industry coverage - 0.003 (4.58)*** 0.003 (1.65) 
Broker size + -0.001 (-9.96)*** 0.000 (-3.90)*** 
Analyst following  -0.001 (-9.60)*** -0.001 (-0.97) 
R2  0.139  
# of observations  76,621 76,621 
 
Panel B. Relative Analysts' Forecast Accuracy  
Variables Predicted sign 
Model 1  
(OLS) 
Model 2  
(Fama-MacBeth) 
Intercept  77.788 (67.46)*** 76.535 (16.59)*** 
Dummy for HHI +/- -0.910 (-3.96)*** -1.097 (-3.59)*** 
Firm size + -1.209 (-13.42)*** -1.080 (-4.09)*** 
Career experience - -0.039 (-0.81) -0.099 (-0.46) 
Firm-specific experience + 0.856 (13.25)*** 1.370 (4.77)*** 
Forecast horizon - -9.691 (-81.75)*** -11.634 (-6.80)*** 
Firm coverage +/- 0.001 (0.03) 0.047 (1.78)* 
Industry coverage - 0.202 (2.23)** 0.114 (1.65) 
Broker size + -0.068 (-5.94)*** -0.017 (-0.57) 
Analyst following  -0.201 (-13.26)*** -0.250 (-4.65)*** 
R2  0.091  
# of observations  76,621 76,621 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** denote significance levels (two-
sided) of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Testing of Hypothesis 2 
 
Applying the model in Cowen et al. (2006), we conduct a multivariate regression to test H2 which investigates the 
association between product market competition and optimism in analysts’ forecasts. In Table 6, the OLS coefficient 
for the Dummy for HHI in Model 1 is 0.030 at the 1% significance level. It suggests that analysts tend to report more 
optimistic EPS forecasts for firms within highly competitive product markets. The results in Model 2 provide 
qualitatively similar results to those in Model 1 and also support the idea of analysts’ forecast optimism in competitive 
markets. Specifically, the coefficient of the Dummy for HHI using the Fama-MacBeth method is significantly positive 
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at the 1% level. These results suggest that as information asymmetry due to competition deteriorates information 
environment of firms, analysts are likely to report more optimistic forecasts to curry favor with managers and gain 
firm-specific non-public information (Huberts & Fuller, 1995; Ackert & Athanassakos, 1997; Das et al., 1998; Lim, 
2001). Overall, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
 
 
Table 6. Analysts' Forecast Optimism 
Variables Model 1  (OLS) 
Model 2  
(Fama-MacBeth) 
Intercept -0.310 (-9.51)*** -0.383 (-3.50)*** 
Dummy for HHI 0.030 (4.65)*** 0.030 (4.20)*** 
Firm size -0.001 (-0.26) 0.001 (0.24) 
Career experience -0.004 (-2.98)*** 0.009 (0.85) 
Firm-specific experience -0.008 (-4.37)*** -0.003 (-0.33) 
Forecast horizon 0.283 (84.33)*** 0.306 (8.09)*** 
Firm coverage -0.008 (-15.71)*** -0.006 (-4.31)*** 
Industry coverage 0.009 (3.69) *** 0.010 (2.40)** 
Broker size -0.002 (-7.29) *** -0.002 (-1.99)* 
Analyst following 0.010 (23.32) *** 0.009 (7.89)*** 
R2 0.098  
# of observations 76,512 76,512 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** denote significance levels (two-
sided) of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Testing of Hypothesis 3 
 
Table 7 reports the results of the multivariate test of Hypothesis 3 by using stock recommendations for the dependent 
variable. Column 2 presents the results using an ordered logit regression and Column 3 reports the results using the 
Fama-MacBeth method. Ordered logit regression is used to consider the discrete and ordinal nature of stock 
recommendations (Cowen et al., 2006; Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008). As a result, the coefficient of the Dummy for 
HHI in Model 1 is 0.038 with significance at the 5% level, suggesting that analysts express significantly higher 
optimism in their stock recommendations in competitive markets. Model 2 of Table 7 indicates that the coefficient of 
the Dummy for HHI is 0.054, which is also significant and positive. These results suggest that since high competition 
causes managers to withhold firm-specific information in order to protect companies from their rivals, analysts may 
provide more optimistic stock recommendations to promote investment banking business and to increase trading 
commissions through maintaining close relationships with managers in pursuit of information (Francis et al., 1997; 
Lin & McNichols, 1998; Irvine, 2004). In summary, all of the results reported in Table 7 provide further support for 
the assertion that product market competition negatively affects analysts’ information environments, which 
discourages proper assessment of stock valuation. 
 
 
Table 7. Stock Recommendation Optimism 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Dummy for HHI 0.038 (2.40)** 0.054 (3.27)*** 
Career experience 0.107 (28.99) ** 0.107 (28.32)*** 
Firm-specific experience -0.101 (-21.28)*** -0.082 (-16.74)*** 
Forecast horizon -0.040 (-4.77)*** -0.043 (-4.97)*** 
Relative forecast accuracy 0.547 (19.18)*** 0.645 (21.80)*** 
Number of strong buy   0.459 (16.17)*** 
Number of buy   -0.037 (-36.21)*** 
Number of hold   -0.389 (-65.62)*** 
Number of underperform   -2.632 (-26.80)*** 
Number of sell   -19.273 (-0.27) 
R2 0.019 0.115 
# of observations 76,621 76,621 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** denote significance levels (two-
sided) of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, we investigate the association between product market competition and analysts’ forecasting properties 
by using analysts’ forecast accuracy, analysts’ forecast bias, and optimism in stock recommendations. We find that 
firms in more competitive product markets have less informative disclosure environments, as evidenced by following 
analysts’ forecasting properties.  
 
First, our results suggest that absolute analysts’ forecast accuracy is positively related to product market competition; 
however, these effects disappear after estimating absolute analysts’ forecast accuracy using the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions (Fama & MacBeth, 1973). These findings are robust to the potential bias issue caused by cross-sectional 
dependencies in the panel data. Next, by using a more sophisticated measure of relative analysts’ forecast accuracy 
we find that product market competition is negatively associated with relative analysts’ forecast accuracy. Since the 
measure of relative analysts’ forecast accuracy takes into account analysts’ performance compared to their peers, our 
findings conclude that high competition in product markets is likely to decrease accuracy in analysts’ forecast (Hong 
& Kubik, 2003; Cowen et al., 2006). Second, in terms of forecast bias, high competition in product markets is related 
to analysts’ forecast optimism. These findings suggest that optimism in analysts’ forecasts increases with information 
complexity due to competition in predicting earnings information. Under such circumstances, analysts’ forecasts are 
shown to have more optimism in order to curry favor with managers in gaining relevant information about the firm 
(Huberts & Fuller, 1995; Ackert & Athanassakos, 1997; Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001). Finally, we find a positive 
association between high competition and optimism in analysts’ stock recommendations. These findings suggest that 
firms in highly competitive markets are less likely to disclose firm-specific information, resulting in inferior 
information environments for the competitive markets.  
 
Overall, the evidence provided in this study is consistent with the findings in extant accounting and finance literature, 
which shows a negative effect of product market competition on corporate information environment as measured by 
analysts’ forecasting properties such as analysts’ forecast accuracy, bias, and optimism in stock recommendations.  
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